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Abstract-- The Greek Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE), 
in view of the initiation of the new wholesale electricity market on 
January 1st 2009 as a Day-Ahead mandatory pool, undertook the 
design and implementation of a simulator for the market. The 
simulator consists of several interacting modules representing all 
key market operations and dynamics including day-ahead 
scheduling, natural gas system constraints, unplanned variability 
of loads and available capacity driven either by uncertain 
stochastic outcomes or deliberate participant schedule deviations, 
real time dispatch, and financial settlement of day ahead and real-
time schedule differences. The modules are integrated into one 
software package. The intended use of the simulator is to 
elaborate on and allow RAE to investigate the impact of 
participant decision strategies on market outcomes. The ultimate 
purpose is to evaluate the effectiveness of Market Rules, whether 
existing or contemplated, in providing incentives for competitive 
behaviour and in discouraging gaming and market manipulation.  
In this paper the simulator is used to analyze market design 
aspects and rules concerning the co-optimization of energy and 
reserves in the Day-Ahead energy market and the efficiency of the 
imbalance settlement procedure compared to real-time pricing.  
Index Terms-- Electricity Market Design, Market Simulation, 
Regulation, Unit Commitment. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
HE development of a liberalized electricity market in 
Greece began with the enactment of Law 2773/1999 [1], 
harmonizing the national legislation with Directive 96/92/EC. 
The Law established new entities within the electricity sector 
in Greece, including the Regulatory Authority for Energy 
(RAE) and the Hellenic Transmission System Operator 
(HTSO), as well as gave general directions for the creation of 
a competitive electricity market. The initial market design of 
year 2001 (based on bilateral transactions and actually being a 
market for deviations) was not considered successful, at least 
in terms of opening the market to new players, given the 
existence of the incumbent utility (Public Power Corporation - 
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PPC), with a market share over 99% both in generation and 
supply. Thus, a subsequent law (L 3175/2003) and a new Grid 
and Market Operation Code (2005) provided for a new market 
design of the day-ahead wholesale market, in the form of a 
mandatory pool [2],[3]. 
In order to evaluate the new electricity market design as 
well as to develop and analyze potential ways in which the 
market may evolve, RAE contracted an external consultant 
(LCG Consulting) to develop a software model (a ´Simulator´) 
of the Greek wholesale electricity market.  
This paper describes both the Simulator as well as results of 
initial work performed using the Simulator to study specific 
rules of the Greek wholesale electricity market. Section ΙΙ 
describes the basic concepts of the Greek wholesale electricity 
market, Section ΙΙΙ presents an overview of the Simulator, 
Section ΙV presents the study case on co-optimization of 
energy and reserves in the Day-Ahead energy market, while 
Section V presents the study case on comparison of the  
imbalance settlement procedure to real-time pricing. Section 
VI summarises the results and presents some next steps 
regarding the applications of the Simulator. 
II.  THE GREEK WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET  
A. Market Structure 
Generation on the Greek interconnected electricity system 
is based mainly on lignite steam units, but also on significant 
hydro capacity which contributes about 10% of total demand. 
In 31.12.2008 the total maximum net generation capacity on 
the interconnected system was 11,871 MW, distributed as 
shown in Table I. 
TABLE I. 
 INSTALLED GENERATION CAPACITY  
Plant type Net capacity (MW) 
Lignite units 4,808.1 
CCGT (n.gas) 1,962.1 
Natural gas - other 486.8 
Oil units 718 
Lake Hydro units 3,016.5 
RES and small cogeneration 769.7 
Other cogeneration 109.7 
As far as the market structure is concerned, the national 
integrated electricity company, PPC, owns about 95% of the 
installed capacity of ‘dispatchable’ units (lignite, natural gas, 
oil and large-hydro). Two competitors hold the remaining 
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about 5% with two natural gas fired units (390MW CCGT and 
150 MW open cycle GT). Considering the RES units (wind, 
photovoltaic, small hydro, biomass, etc) and small co-
generation not owned by PPC, then PPC´s market share in 
terms of installed capacity amounts to around 90%. 
B. The Greek wholesale electricity market  
The Greek wholesale electricity market consists of: 
1) The Day Ahead (DA) market, where the scheduling and 
clearing of the total energy produced and consumed in 
Greece, as well as imports and exports, takes place 
(‘mandatory’ pool).  
2) The Real Time Dispatch operation. 
3) The Imbalances Settlement, which includes the settlement 
of deviations from the DA program and the settlement of 
the services required for the balancing of the system. 
4) The Capacity Assurance Mechanism, through which part of 
the fixed costs of the production capacity are covered1.  
All transactions are made via the Day-Ahead market (pool), 
which does not include bilateral transactions with physical 
delivery and respective contracts between producers, suppliers 
and customers. However, bilateral financial contracts may be 
freely concluded outside the Pool. 
1) The Day-Ahead (DA) Market: The DA market constitutes 
the first stage of the wholesale market process and comprises 
of the following individual markets, which are co-optimized: 
• Energy Market 
• Energy Reserves Market 
• Market mechanism for the allocation of the production 
near the consumption centers 
On a daily basis, participants in the Energy Market submit 
offers (bids) for energy generation (demand) in the form of a 
10-step stepwise increasing (decreasing) function of prices 
(Euro/MWh) and quantities (MWh) for each of the 24 hour 
periods of the next day. Generators also submit offers for the 
Reserves Market, as a single pair of price (Euro/MW) and 
quantity (MW) for each reserve category (Primary & 
Secondary reserve). 
After the gate closure (at 12.30 pm), the HTSO, in its role of 
Market Operator, solves the DA problem based on the bids 
and offers of the participants. More specifically, the problem is 
formulated as a Security Constrained Unit Commitment, 
maximizing the social welfare for all 24 hours of the next day 
simultaneously. The algorithm matches the hourly energy to be 
absorbed (according to the Load Declarations) with the energy 
to be injected in the System (based on the Injection Offers, 
separate for each unit), while meeting a set of constraints. The 
main constraints considered are transmission system 
constraints (mainly in the form of North to South maximum 
transfer of power), technical constraints of the generating units 
and the reserve requirements. The solution of the DA problem 
(formulated as a Mixed Integer Program) determines for each 
Dispatch Period (i.e. each hour) of the Dispatch Day the state 
(ON/OFF) of generation units, generation of each unit and also 
the clearing prices of the Energy (System Marginal Price - 
SMP) and Reserve Markets.  
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 This mechanism is not part of the Simulator and thus will not be 
discussed. 
The incorporation in the DA problem of the reserve 
requirements and of the transmission system constraints 
minimizes the deviations of the DA Schedule from the real 
time operation of the generation units and therefore reduces 
the volume of Imbalances Settlement transactions. 
The resulting hourly SMP of the DA energy market is the 
uniform price at which the Load Representatives buy the 
energy they expect their customers will absorb from the 
System and at the same time is the price paid to the Producers. 
In most cases the SMP takes a single price for all the 
Producers, independently of their geographical position. 
However, if the Transmission System Constraints are 
activated, this will result in two different Marginal Prices for 
generation, for the North and South System respectively2. The 
differentiation of the SMP for the Producers reflects the zonal 
value of electricity and provides the necessary economic 
signals to the Producers for the construction of their units in 
sites where their value to the System is higher, so as to remove 
the existing constraints. 
All the procedures of DA, including financial settlement of 
the resulting energy transactions, are concluded within the day 
that precedes the Dispatch Day (i.e. the day of the physical 
delivery of energy). 
2) The Real Time Dispatch operation (RTD): In real-time, 
i.e. every 5 minutes, the HTSO dispatches generating units 
already committed by the DA market in order to meet the load 
and minimise generation costs while ensuring overall system 
reliability [4]. To this objective, the problem is formulated as a 
Linear Program, with objective to minimize generation costs 
subject to constraints for meeting the load (here as load is 
assumed the load projection for the next 5-min interval), 
generation units technical constraints, network constraints and 
reserve requirements. The same as in the DA offers (and bids) 
are used for the RTD. 
3) Imbalances Settlement: Differences between (i) the 
production and consumption quantities, as well as the reserves 
scheduled in the DA Market and (ii) the corresponding 
quantities measured according to the actual operation of the 
System, are settled during the Imbalances Settlement 
operation. The participants are credited or debited depending 
whether they had positive or negative deviations from their DA 
Schedule. Moreover, all instructed deviations of the Producers 
are paid at least at their variable cost. The imbalances are 
settled at the ex-post zonal SMP (EPSMP) calculated by 
solving again the same DA problem as in the day-ahead, but 
this time using the actual data for the load, RES generation and 
generation unit availability (ExPIP). 
III.  OVERVIEW OF THE SIMULATOR  
The Simulator consists of several modules, which can be 
classified as simulating modules, or auxiliary modules. 
Simulating modules utilize main computational engines, many 
of which are used in more than one module. The main 
Simulator modules are (a more detailed description of the 
Simulator may be found in [3]): 
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(i) The Day-Ahead Electricity Market Clearing (DAEMC). 
This module implements a MIP algorithm that determines the 
optimal schedule of generation, demand and reserves of the 
DA market.   
(ii) A module that runs a Load Flow (LF) of the Greek 
transmission system. The LF module is used to identify the 
weak points in the transmission system, likely to impose 
constraints on the ability to transfer power between different 
zones. It converts this information to input needed for 
constraint specification in the DAEMC problem. The module 
provides estimates of inter-zonal power transfer limits in order 
to specify transmission constraints needed as input to the 
DAEMC software module.  
(iii)  A module that solves the five minute Economic Dispatch 
(ED) problem using look-ahead information from the DAEMC 
problem solution. The ED module is used to simulate the real-
time operation of the Greek electricity system. It operates on a 
five-minute basis and it is very consistent with the economic 
dispatch optimization algorithm used by the HTSO. In order to 
dispatch generation units while respecting transmission 
constraints, a Power Flow algorithm is incorporated in the ED 
module. A crucial difference between the ED and the 
DAEMC, is that the ED module does not perform any unit 
commitment i.e. it is not required to make any decisions 
regarding start-up or shut-down. Rather, it follows the existing 
commitment schedule, unless a significant event has taken 
place leading to a re-commitment.  
(iv) Another functionality of the ED module is to capture 
variations in the input data that mimic the variations that can 
be attributed to uncertainty in the real world. These variations 
are generated by an auxiliary module, the Volatility Module. 
The purpose of the volatility module is to add a real-time 
dimension to a scenario by automatically generating deviations 
between the Day Ahead and the Real Time input data. 
(v) A module that compares the DAEMC hourly schedule to 
the corresponding outcome of the ED and performs the 
Financial Settlement of Differences (FSoD) according to the 
market rules. The FSoD module is used to perform the 
necessary calculations regarding the energy deviations settled 
during the Imbalances Settlement. It is the settlement module 
of the Simulator and its principle task is to perform the credit 
and charge calculations exactly as they appear in the Grid and 
Market Operation Code. 
(vi) the Ex Post Imbalance Pricing (ExPIP) process, which is 
a 24-hr unit commitment application executed after each 
Dispatch Day to determine the Ex Post System Marginal Price 
(EPSMP) for imbalance energy, which is used for settlement 
of imbalances. ExPIP is very similar to DAEMC, but it takes 
into account the actual hourly demand, actual unit availability 
and actual generation by intermittent renewable energy 
sources. 
Further, some special functionality has been added and 
integrated in the Simulator, in the sense of providing even 
more realism to the operations simulated. 
These features are: 
- Demand priority queue logic: This logic is used to ensure 
that demand bid queue will be preserved, even in the event 
of a market split. Demand bids will be cleared in 
competitive order, regardless of the zone in which they 
were bid. This logic was necessary since load bids are 
cleared to the uniform average price, while production bids 
are cleared to their respective zonal prices. 
- Uninstructed deviations logic: Uninstructed deviations 
logic aims to capture the effects when generators do not 
follow instructions and dispatch orders issued by TSO in 
real time. While the HTSO follows a specific procedure for 
flagging these units and then performs the economic 
dispatch without considering them thereafter, this 
procedure is based on the experience and logic of the 
dispatcher and not on some pre-specified procedure on 
some operations manual. Thus the aim of the uninstructed 
deviations logic is to lead to a simulated operation very 
close to the ‘real-life’ one, in the case of uninstructed 
deviations. 
- Recommitment logic: A special logic controlled within the 
ED execution, which is used to simulate decisions taken in 
real time regarding alternation of unit commitment and 
production schedule, when system conditions and sources 
availability vary greatly from those predicted in the day-
ahead. 
IV.  ENERGY-RESERVE CO-OPTIMIZATION STUDY 
A.  Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of the 
Energy and Reserve co-optimization in the DA and examine 
the pricing rule for reserves. Currently, while energy is paid 
according to marginal pricing, primary and secondary reserves 
are paid according to the highest respective offer accepted in 
the DA and tertiary reserve is not paid at all3. Alternatively, 
the marginal pricing rule could also hold for the reserves.  
When there is abundant available generating capacity, the 
energy and reserve commodities are decoupled and the 
marginal prices are equal to the highest respective accepted 
offer prices4. Under these conditions, generating units may 
provide several of these commodities and still have some spare 
capacity. The existence of spare generating capacity nullifies 
the opportunity cost of providing reserves since it does not 
come at the expense of energy production. Therefore, under 
spare capacity, the two pricing rules are equivalent.  
On the other hand, when generating capacity is limited, this 
equivalence does not hold any more. Consider for example a 
0-100MW unit with a low Energy Offer (equal to its variable 
cost) of 20 €/MWh and a Reserve Offer of 2 €/MWh. If the 
SMP clears at 30 €/MWh in a given Dispatch Period, this unit 
is infra-marginal for Energy profiting €10 for each MW 
schedule. Ignoring reserves, the optimal schedule for this unit 
would be 100MW, i.e., full load. Assume now that this is the 
only unit that can provide the specified Reserve and that the 
Reserve requirement is 10MW. The optimal solution would be 
to back down this unit to 90MW so that it can provide the 
required Reserve. Assume also that the SMP remains at 30 
€/MWh. The net cost to the unit for providing each MW of the 
Reserve is its Reserve Offer price of €2 plus the foregone 
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4
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profit of €10 for not producing Energy out of that capacity. 
Therefore, the marginal cost of providing the next increment 
of Reserve from this unit is its Reserve Offer price of €2 plus 
the lost opportunity cost of €10, for a total of 12 €/MW. 
Consequently, due to opportunity costs, the marginal price for 
a given reserve may exceed the highest accepted price for that 
reserve. Even if a certain reserve, such as tertiary reserve, is 
priced at zero, i.e., all tertiary Reserve Offers are at zero price, 
the marginal price for tertiary reserve may not necessarily be 
zero.  
B.  Data Setup 
The market data for Tuesday, July 22, 2008 are used (found 
in [2]), which can be considered a typical summer day. This 
day was selected as a peak load case, where the available 
thermal units’ capacity cannot meet energy demand and 
reserve requirements, hence dispatching hydro units is 
necessary. In general, year 2008 was a dry year, which implies 
a rather high value for the hydro units’ offers. More 
specifically, the energy offers of the hydro units are assumed 
to be priced at €125/MWh, which is higher than the highest 
thermal unit energy offer, assumed equal to their variable 
cost5. This bidding strategy ensures that hydro units, although 
fully available to provide reserves, are scheduled for energy 
only after all available online thermal unit capacity is fully 
scheduled; this bidding strategy is consistent with dry year 
conditions where water needs to be preserved. For simplicity, 
generating units submitted the same reserve offers: Primary 
Reserve Offers were priced at 2 €/MW, Secondary Reserve 
Offers were priced at 1 €/MW, and Tertiary Spinning and 
Non-Spinning Reserve Offers were priced at 0 €/MW. 
C.  Energy-Reserve Co-Optimization 
The results of the simulation show that hydro units are on 
the margin for energy for the most part of the day, setting the 
SMP to 127.68 €/MWh, which is the (loss-adjusted) hydro 
Energy Offer price. Although the Primary Reserve Offer price 
was only 2 €/MW, the Primary Reserve marginal price ranged 
between 2 €/MW to 40.43 €/MW. The difference between the 
marginal price and the bid price is due to the relevant 
opportunity cost for providing Primary Reserve. Similar 
results were obtained for Secondary Reserve Up and Down, 
whose prices ranged between 1 €/MW to 1.87 €/MW and 1 
€/MW to 61.72 €/MW, respectively. The marginal prices are 
presented in Fig.1. 
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 Fig.1.  Energy and Reserve Marginal Prices. 
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 The exact level of offer prices is not important for our results.  
As discussed above, the opportunity cost for providing 
either Primary or Secondary Up Reserves, in this example, 
becomes nonzero when the unit called for the reserve is infra-
marginal. Primary Reserve is offered only by the thermal units. 
Therefore, during the peak hours of the day, when hydro units 
are marginal and thermal units infra-marginal, the least-cost 
dispatch is achieved by the provision of Primary Reserve from 
the committed units with the most expensive energy offers6. 
Then, the Primary Energy Requirement will be satisfied by 
first exhausting the Primary Reserve capability of the most 
expensive unit, then proceed to the second most expensive, etc 
until the Requirement is satisfied. The last unit, in the above 
sequence, to provide this Reserve will also define the marginal 
price, equal to its offer price plus its opportunity cost. 
Similarly for Secondary Reserve Down, during the off-peak 
hours of the day, when lignite units are marginal (but without 
the capability to provide Secondary Reserve), thermal CCGT 
units are dispatched. In this case the units will be dispatched 
starting from the ones with the lowest energy offers. 
The opportunity costs for Secondary Reserve Up and 
Tertiary Spinning Reserve were almost always zero. The 
situation would be different if hydro energy bids were lower 
than thermal energy bids; in that case, hydro units would be 
infra-marginal in energy, hence reserve provision would 
demand high opportunity costs.  
To illustrate the effects of Energy-Reserve co-optimization, 
Fig.2 and Fig.3 display the allocation of the capacity of a 
CCGT and a hydro unit among energy and reserves.  
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Fig.2.  Energy and Reserve Schedule of a CCGT Unit. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Qu
a
n
tit
y 
(M
W
)
0:00 3:00 6:00 9:00 12:00 15:00 18:00 21:00
Dispatch Period (Hour)
Tert. Non-Spin
Tert. Spin
Sec. Up
Sec. Down
Primary
Energy
 
Fig.3.  Energy and Reserve Schedule of a Hydro Unit.  
From the above analysis it is evident that the current reserve 
pricing scheme underpays Producers for providing Reserves. 
Opportunity costs cannot be denied to Participants; they will 
eventually capture them, but at the cost of imposing risks in 
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market participation and providing incentives against cost 
reflective bidding.    
The conclusions from this study are as follows: 
1. The remuneration price of reserves should not be the 
highest accepted Reserve Offer, because that may be an 
insufficient price. 
2.  A separate settlement should apply to Secondary Reserve 
Up and Secondary Reserve Down, since these two 
services have in general different marginal prices.  
3. Tertiary Reserve schedules should be remunerated at the 
relevant marginal price and Tertiary Reserve Offers 
should be permitted. 
V.  REAL-TIME PRICING STUDY 
A.  Introduction 
This study compares the existing imbalance settlement 
mechanism, based on the hourly Ex-Post System Marginal 
Price (EPSMP), determined by the Ex Post Imbalance Pricing 
(ExPIP) process, with a real-time deviation settlement using 
the 5-min System Imbalance Marginal Price (SIMP) 
determined by ED.  
B.  Data Setup 
The analysis was performed for an average demand case, in 
order to allow for significant price changes in real time due to 
load deviations. Therefore we used the market data for 
Sunday, February 17, 2008, which can be considered a typical 
winter weekend day [2]. We assumed that the actual demand 
was about 5% higher than the demand forecast used in the 
DAEMC, due to demand under-scheduling and demand 
forecast error. The demand deviation was met in real time by 
ED using tertiary reserve procured by DAEMC and other 
available capacity from online units or offline hydro units that 
have a fast-start capability.  
The actual demand was created by using the Volatility 
module of the Simulator. This was done by taking the original 
hourly demand forecast used in DAEMC and generating from 
it 5-minute demand values using a quadratic interpolation 
method. The quadratic interpolation was assumed to have an 
interpolation error which followed a normal distribution 
function, with a mean of 1.05 and a standard deviation of 
0.0017. The resulting 5-min simulated actual demand that was 
used in ED is presented in Fig. 4. 
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Fig.4.  Simulated 5-minute Demand Curve. 
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 Specifically for the first hour the mean error was assumed equal to 1 (i.e. 
no shifting), in order to avoid infeasibilities related to the initial conditions. 
On the day we are investigating, three lignite units and a 
natural gas unit, with a total capacity of almost 1000 MW, 
weren’t operating, due to maintenance and outage reasons. As 
this would stress our case and wouldn’t illustrate the 
differences between EPSMP and SIMP, we have assumed that 
two of the three lignite units were actually operational. Still 
most of the thermal units operate at full capacity during most 
of the peak hours. Finally, we used the same bids as in the 
previous study. 
C.  Comparison of Real-Time Pricing Alternatives 
The two settlement methods described above, based on 
EPSMP and SIMP, are compared. To simplify the analysis and 
isolate the effects of real-time volatility, it is assumed that no 
uninstructed deviations take place, so that the metered energy 
production matches the instructed energy production. Then the 
imbalances’ cost is determined as the product of the imbalance 
quantity with the corresponding price. The imbalance is 
defined as the difference between the day-ahead schedule and 
the 5-min dispatch instructions from ED. A positive outcome 
is a charge, whereas a negative outcome is a payment. Under 
the previously mentioned simplification, the two methods of 
imbalance settlement differ only on the calculation period, 
being hourly for EPSMP and 5-min for SIMP. The hourly 
imbalances are equal to the average of the twelve 5-min 
imbalances during the hour.  
The 5-min SIMP from ED and the hourly EPSMP from 
ExPIP are displayed in Fig.5. It is demonstrated that the hourly 
EPSMP fails to capture the volatility of the real-time market, 
which is evident in the 5-min variation of the SIMP. The 
differences manifest mostly: 
a. During the sharp ramp up and down periods of the 
Dispatch Day. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
ramping limitations of the units constrain the 5-min ED 
problem more than the hourly ExPIP problem. 
b. During hours 16:30 to 18:00 and 22:00 to 00:00. Here, 
the reason is that ED takes the commitment of the 
DAEMC as given, while ExPIP assumes recommitment 
is possible. In our study, the DAEMC solution 
decommited a large natural gas unit, replacing it with a 
smaller one, set to begin operation at 18:00. ED took 
this timing as given, while ExPIP shifted it.  
Note that the above differences are exaggerated in Fig. 5, as 
the marginal price switches between lignite or natural gas unit 
bids to hydro unit bids, since hydro units provide the 
additional capacity required, due to their fast-start capability.  
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Fig.5.  Marginal Prices for ExPIP and ED. 
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It is interesting to note that by running again the ED, but 
assuming also a recommitment at 12:00, the differences in 
SIMP and EPSMP decrease significantly, as seen in Fig.6. 
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Fig.6.  Marginal Prices for ExPIP and ED, under ED with recommitment. 
The hourly ED and ExPIP net generator imbalance payments 
are illustrated in Fig. 7, for the ED run without recommitment. 
Note that the net generator imbalance settlement in each 
Dispatch Period was negative, i.e., it was a payment, due to the 
5% demand increase in real time. The total cost of imbalances 
amounted to 700,000 € in the case of ExPIP and to 800,000 € 
in the case of ED, when the value of energy traded in the DA 
was 23,5 mil. €. More than half (about 55%) of this payment 
was made to hydro units, as they were dispatched to meet the 
load deviations from one 5-min interval to the next. 
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Fig.7.  ED and ExPIP net generator imbalance payments. 
The conclusions from this study are as follows:  
1. The hourly EPSMP, determined from ExPIP, does not 
capture the volatility of the 5-min SIMP, determined 
from ED. 
2. Since the 5-min dispatch instructions, and thus the 
resultant instructed imbalance energy, are the outcome of 
ED, the 5-min SIMP is the marginal price that 
corresponds to these instructions, and not EPSMP.  
3. The imbalance settlement using the EPSMP results in 
lower payments to Producers than using the 5-min SIMP. 
Hydro units are most affected by this shortfall, as they 
are dispatched to meet the 5-min load deviations that are 
not reflected in the flat hourly load of ExPIP, particularly 
during the sharp ramp up and down periods of a day. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
In order to analyze the electricity market design, RAE 
developed a ´Simulator´ of the Greek wholesale market. The 
Simulator is used to analyze current rules concerning: (a) the 
co-optimization of energy and reserves in the DA energy 
market, and (b) the efficiency of the imbalance settlement 
procedure compared to real-time pricing. Results from the first 
case study show that the current rule concerning the price of 
reserves (equal to the highest accepted Reserve Offer) should 
be re-considered since, when the energy and reserve 
commodities are coupled, Producers are underpaid for 
providing Reserves. Results from the second case study show 
that the imbalance settlement using hourly step (as in the 
EPSMP module) results in lower payments to Producers than 
using a 5-min step (as in SIMP). Hydro units are most affected 
by this shortfall, as they are dispatched to meet the 5-min load 
deviations that are not reflected in the flat hourly load of the 
hourly commitment schedule (ExPIP module), particularly 
during the sharp ramp up and down periods of a day. 
DISCLAIMER 
The material contained in this paper is for information, 
education, research and academic purposes only. Any 
opinions, proposals and positions expressed in this paper are 
solely and exclusively of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the views of RAE. 
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